where is afghan policy leading?

October 31, 2006

Meghan O’Sullivan is the most senior Bush Administration official handling Afghanistan policy. It was learned that O’Sullivan didn’t know what the Durand Line was. This stuns me … If she wasn’t familiar with this basic point. the issue was brought up in a meeting between an Afghan expert and O’Sullivan. O’Sullivan is a deputy national security adviser in the Bush White House.

After Iraq, Afghanistan is the most profound foreign policy mess the Bush Administration faces. Five years after US forces chased the Taliban out of Kabul, the Taliban are resurgent, adopting tactics used by Iraqi rebels. The central government of President Hamid Karzai remains weak and cannot provide security or basic services to its people. Reconstruction has slowed dramatically.
Poppy cultivation has exploded. Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan are affecting the military campaigns against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. And the consensus among Afghanistan experts is that many Afghans, seeing little direct benefit from the lagging reconstruction efforts, have lost faith in the US-backed government. According to recent Congressional testimony by Barnett Rubin, a New York University professor who has advised the United Nations on Afghanistan, a former Afghan minister recently said, “The conditions in Afghanistan are ripe for fundamentalism.”
Yet George Bush has no senior-level official responsible for policies and actions in Afghanistan. “The situation is worsening,” notes former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. “We have to have someone in government responsible for the whole picture–military, economic assistance and political.
There’s a nexus between each. But there’s not one person in the government designated to be in charge of that nexus. It could be the ambassador. It could be someone else–if they have resources and clout and accountability. But this Administration has not been keen on accountability.”

O’Sullivan is an icon of how the US handles one of the most important foreign policy issues.

She has a US security approach to the issue. she neither has the resources nor the talent to speed up the reconstruction, she is not making the policy but pursuing the “security agenda”. She is neither a neocon nor an ideologue.
She has even earned the suspicion of conservatives for having proposed engaging with Iran and for suggesting–before 9/11–that it is unproductive to brand a state a “rogue regime.” The problem is that O’Sullivan, who is in her mid-30s, is not an expert.

It has been a year and a half since the Bush Administration had a major player covering Afghanistan. That was Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-American named ambassador to Afghanistan and a special presidential envoy in 2003. He was well schooled in the nation’s history and culture and its internecine conflicts.
In 2002, as a special envoy, he oversaw the loya jirga that led to the establishment of a government there. He later negotiated with regional Afghan leaders. “He would routinely jump into a car and go over to Karzai’s office to give him marching orders, for good or bad,” says a Congressional aide who witnessed such occasions. A neocon advocate of the Iraq War and a disciple of Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, Khalilzad had direct lines into the White House and the Pentagon. In March 2005 he was named US ambassador to Iraq.
Khalilzad was replaced by Ronald Neumann. Neumann lacked the standing of
Khalilzad. “He tries, but he’s not able to get stuff done,” Rubin says. “He does not have the clout. When I ask him for something difficult, he says, ‘It will never get through the bureaucracy.'”
Until this past March, Maureen Quinn, who had been US ambassador to Qatar, was the State Department’s coordinator for Afghanistan. But she, too, did not wield much influence. After she left the post the Administration appointed no successor. Instead, her duties were split among four State Department officials: Richard Boucher, the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, and three of his deputies. But Boucher’s bureau is responsible for thirteen countries, including Pakistan, India and Kazakhstan. The Afghanistan and Central Asia brief was added to his bureau only this past February.
“The coordination issue has been up in the air for some time,” says Ali Ahmad Jalali, a former Afghan interior minister, “and there is less money now. And the country is facing the consequences.”

In Washington the bottom line in dollars usually represents the bottom line in policy, and US funding for reconstruction and security assistance in Afghanistan has been on the decline. From fiscal year 2005 to the next, it fell from $4.3 billion to $3 billion. The Administration’s request for 2007 funding is $1.2 billion. Of that only about $800 million is tagged for reconstruction and development. “You can’t rebuild a country for $1 billion,” notes a senior Democratic staffer in the Senate. “To me it says we’re just going to hope that things get better without making the necessary commitment.”

The decline in funding coincides with the worsening situation. The Afghan wound is bleeding worst and worst, yet the serum is getting cut off.

On the policy side the administration is seeking an alternative to nation building. Senate majority leader Bill Frist recently said that the Taliban and their allies ought to be brought into the government.

This practically means the end of Afghanistan. Fortunately his office later claimed he had meant to refer only to tribal Afghans possibly sympathetic to the Taliban.

But Karzai proceeded and offered, several times, the Fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar peace talks.

Instead, the one-eyed leader with a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head has repeated his threat to prosecute Karzai in an Islamic court for the “massacre” of Afghans.

“There can be no talks with the Afghan puppet government in the presence of foreign occupying forces. Hamid Karzai and his colleagues should first free themselves from the slavery of foreign infidels and then invite us for negotiations.” Tayyab Agha said by satellite phone from a secret place.

Mullah Omar is now the strongest he has ever been and negotiating with terrorists when they are strong is not easy. Opine anti-terrorism experts like Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, director of the DST, France’s lead counter-terrorism agency, have detected ‘a new flow’ of militants heading to Afghanistan, according to a report in the Los Angles Times.
The expert view is that these militants see a ‘clearer battleground and a wealth of targets’ in Afghanistan these days five years after the Taliban was
thrown out of the country in a war that signalled the beginning of a long global battle.

not only is there no one at the helm of the under funded policy; the Bush Administration has been unable to forge a consistent approach to the critical issue of Pakistan and the Taliban. In June Ambassador Neumann sidestepped a question about whether Pakistan was supporting the Taliban. In August Gen. John Abizaid, commander of the US Central Command, said that he “absolutely does not believe” that Pakistan has been colluding with the Taliban. But in
September Marine Gen. James Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, which has just assumed command of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, told a senate committee that it was “generally accepted” that the Taliban maintain
their headquarters in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province.

This naturally suggests that Pakistan–or elements within its government–is assisting the Taliban. (On October 7 Pakistani police arrested more than forty Taliban suspects, but said they had nabbed no significant Taliban.)
How should the Bush Administration deal with the thorny matter of Pakistan and the Taliban?

As a sign of confession the administration remained silent, in spite President Karzai and Nato commanders apprehension and concerns, after the controversial armistice between Taliban and Pakistan in North Waziristan.

The Afghanistan desks at the State Department and the National Security Council ponder this and other issues daily, but nongovernmental Afghanistan watchers say they see few, if any, signs that senior Administration officials are fully grappling with this dicey subject and the other challenges of Afghanistan.
the policy decision is falling in the hands of the three- and four-star American generals on the ground. Since the diplomats recycle through and have no experience in the area. “Everyone in the region assumes that the United States is not serious about succeeding in Afghanistan.” Says Rubin.

former career foreign service officer who was ambassador to Pakistan, notes,
“In 2004 I saw a huge surge of interest in the White House, with the President
getting directly involved. Now I see less interest. I feel less hopeful.
People coming back from Afghanistan are not optimistic.” Richard Lugar, Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recently said at a hearing that the problems in Afghanistan have “become so daunting that there is a feeling, not of confusion or frustration, but of almost general despair.”

As part of the despair moves Karzai has written to influential ethnic Pashtun politicians in Pakistan asking for their support to stem a growing Taliban insurgency. The letters was sent to Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, leader of the opposition in Pakistan’s National Assembly. Fazal-ur-Rehman is the father of Taliban and a leading pro-Taliban cleric.

In September George W. Bush brought Karzai and Musharraf to Washington for a dinner together. With the two bickering in dueling CNN interviews over the Taliban matter, Bush remarked, “It will be interesting for me to watch the body language of these two leaders to determine how tense things are.” (Referring to that comment, Armitage exclaims, “I didn’t believe it. This is not a high school football game.”) There was no immediate indication Bush achieved much during the meal. But the day before, the President told Karzai, “I know there are some in your country who wonder whether or not America has got the will to do the hard work necessary to help you succeed. We have got that will.”
Perhaps. But no one to do the work.

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ISAD soldier kill in Uruzgan…

October 30, 2006

One soldier of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was killed and eight more wounded in a landmine blast in the southern Uruzgan province, says a press release issued here late last night.

The ISAF convoy was caught in the blast of an improvised explosive device (IED), said the release. The attack also injured three civilians, who were rushed to an ISAF medical facility for treatment.

According to NATO policy, names of the dead and injured soldiers would be released by their relevant country.
A day earlier, 14 people were killed and three wounded when a passenger vehicle hit a landmine in Tirin Kot, capital of the same province.


tajikistun

October 26, 2006
I had some coffee and melon at fredy’s place. A youngster is sitting behind a table outside, watching the door; he has his books pilled up in front of him but he is not reading. Judging by the amount of book he clings to, I think he wanted a job where he could do his studies too. Sitting in a foreigner house doing random things is his ideal option.

Found a rickshaw as I walked out the door. With difficulty managed to fit myself and my bags in it. The driver started asking me where I go. I said to Tajikistan.

He said “what for?”

“for a visit” I said.

“why?”

can we just go to ‘bandar imam sahib’

“of course, I understand. Its morning and Ramazan, it’s not a good idea to talk too much when you are holding fast. You might say something unwanted”

on his windshield he has pictures of half naked bollywood actresses. I was wondering if he thought those are fine in Ramazan.

After ten minutes of driving he told me we were at shirkhan bandar cars terminal.

I said “no it’s not here”

“it’s here but there are no cars” he continued “I can take you to shirkhan bandar”

there was no way his old rickshaw could drive 65KM – at least not in a day.

As I get off the rickshaw with my bags, a corolla stopped and asked me if I was going to shirkhan bandar. As we are haggling on the price another corolla with an occupant stops and the guy shouts “I will take you half of what he asks for”

As I am reaching shirkhan Bandar, a few kilometres from the port I see a check point. The soldier orders me to get off the car here; the car has the permit and could go further.

The soldier added “wait with these guys for the bus”

“I need to go on this car” I said.

After some bargain and persuasion of some cash, he agreed to let me through in the car.

Now I am at the customs office in shirkhan bandar. The police officer who stamped out my passport was very interested how much money would tolo tv make a month.

The cops in the corridor wanted to check my bags. “I need to check your bags”

“that is fine”

“you know, there is a lot of drug trafficking across the border. So I really need to see it thoroughly”

“ok”

“dude, pay for my iftar and save both of us some trouble”

At the river bank we had to wait for a furry to take us across. There were a couple of guys with their families and some guys taking car to sell in tajikistan. The furry is organised by one of konduz authorities and it charged the same amount I paid to travel 430km from Kabul to the north.

As the furry stopped on the Tajik side a military man and woman jumped into it to check the passports. They didn’t like my photo; it took them some time to be convinced it’s not fake. While they were holding my passport, they were collecting bribe from the car owners, one refused and it give them a better reason to harass somebody so they returned my passport.

A bus took us to tajik bordor police. A cop came out and ordered us to wait outside and wait in turns, then he asked all women to go first, since both of the women were with some children and their husbands so they had to go too. Half an hour later the same military woman who met us on the furry came out and asked for all Tajikistan passport holders to go for stamping.

Then it was the turn of the line and I was first. There was a military man who was filling in the embarkment forms for everyone, that is why it was taking so long for one person to finish. He asked for ten dollars. I said I can do it myself. He replied “of course you can’t, it needs precision. I am the only one who can do this. There are 15 people with you, go and ask if any of them could do it themselves”

Made outside the compound, very tangible tajik world. Taxi drivers offering ride as their golden teeth were shining. Women in long tajik dress and without head hijab were selling cigarettes.


خصوصى سازى استخراج معادن سبب بهبود زندگى مردم خواهد شد

October 21, 2006
با انجام پروسه خصوصى سازى معادن تا پنج سال آينده ، تمامى بودجۀ عادى کشور از عوايدداخلى تمويل و تا ده سال آينده ،يک تغيير بزرگ و عمده در بهبود زندگى مردم افغانستان رونماخواهدشد.

اين مطلب را انجنير محمد ابراهيم عادل وزير معادن ،طى کنفرانس خبرى به هدف گزارش از کارهاى انجام شدۀ آن وزارت، به تاريخ ٢٨ ميزان بيان نمود .

در شرايط فعلى به علت کمبود عوايد داخلى ، پنجاه فيصد بودجۀ عادى و صد فيصد بودجۀ انکشافى دولت ، از کمک هاى کشورهاى خارجى تمويل مى گردد .

عادل مى گويد که آنها براساس سياست اقتصادى دولت ، يعنى اقتصاد بازار آزاد ، پروسۀ سپردن معادن به سکتور خصوصى را آغاز نموده اند .

در سياست بازار آزاد، فعاليت هاى اقتصادى توسط سکتور خصوصى داخلى وخارجى انجام مى شود، دروازه هاى کشور، براى واردات اجناس مختلف قانونى از کشورهاى متفاوت باز مى با شد و دولت در آن ،نقش نظاره گر و کنترول کننده را بر عهده دارد .

قرار معلومات عادل ، تاکنون فابريکۀ سمنت غورى و ذغال سنگ کرکردود کش در بغلان ، سمنت جبل السراج در پروان ،معدن فلورايد در ارزگان ، معدن طلاى هرات ومعدن سنگهاى قيمتى در پشه گک نورستان بعد از طى پروسه داوطلبى به سکتور خصوصى سپرده شده است .

فلورايد نوعى از سنگ هاى معدنى مى باشد که در توليد شيشه از آن استفاده مى گردد.

همچنان وى افزودکه معادن احجار کريمه در ولايات بدخشان ، پنجشير ، نورستان ، کنر ، لغمان و ساحات مرکزى ، دو بلاک گاز در ولايت جوزجان و يک بلاک تيل در سرپل ، مس عينک لوگر ، کرومايت ساحات جنوبى ، خوست ، پکتيکا، ذغال سنگ پکتيا، طلاى درۀ کيهان بغلان ،طلاى غزنى به داوطلبى سپرده شده و يابه زودى سپرده خواهد شد.

کرومايت يکنوع سنگ معدنى است که در فابريکه ذوب آهن استفاده مى گردد.

قرار معلومات موصوف پروسه خصوصى سازى، بعداز تائيد شوراى وزيران و تکميل پروسۀ داوطلبى به شکل شفاف صورت مى گيرد .

به گفتۀ وى ، به دليلى که پيش از اين، شمارى از معادن عوايد بسيار کمى براى دولت داشته و حتى مقدار زيادى از مصارف آنها نيز از طريق بودجۀ انکشافى دولت تامين مى گرديد، پروسه خصوصى سازى را روى دست گرفتند .

نامبرده مى گويد که شمارى از اين معادن، همچنان به شکل غير قانونى واز سوى اشخاص غير مسؤول استخراج مى گرديد .

وى افزودکه بعداز سپرده شدن اين معادن به سکتور خصوصى عوايد آنها ده ها مرتبه افزايش خواهد يافت و براى هزاران تن ، زمينۀ کار فراهم خواهد شد .

همچنان عادل در کنفرانس خبرى امروزى گفت که آنچه که اکنون آنها در مورد ظرفيت معادن افغانستان مى دانند در حقيقت تنها ده فيصد معادن موجود در کشور مى باشد .

قرار گفتۀ وى ،آنها بعداز انجام سروى و تحقيقات صورت گرفته از سوى ادارۀ سروى جيولوجى امريکاکه براساس قراردادى با آن وزارت انجام شده ، به اين موضوع پى برده اند .

موصوف مى گويد که براساس معلومات فعلى در افغانستان ، حدود چهار صد ذخاير و مظاهر معدن وجود دارد .

به گفته موصوف ، مسؤولين آن وزارت براى جذب سرمايه گذارى هاى خارجى در بخش معادن ، سفرهايى را به کشورهاى چين ، ترکمنستان ، امريکا و قزاقستان داشته اندکه در جريان آن ، از زمينۀ مساعد سرمايه گذارى در افغانستان به سکتور خصوصى معلومات ارائه نموده اند .

وى افزودکه تنها مشکلات عمدۀ آنها در مقابل پروسه خصوصى سازى ، افکارمخالف شمارى از مسؤولين به ارتباط اقتصاد بازار آزاد مى باشد .

همچنان وى از ايجاد مرکز احجار قيمتى براى جلوگيرى از قاچاق آنها ، بازسازى تعميرهاى وزارت ، کورسهاى آموزشى براى کارمندان وغيره به عنوان عمده ترين دستاوردهايش در چهار ونيم ماه گذشته ياد نمود .

شمارى از تحليلگران امور اقتصادى اين اقدام دولت را ستايش مى نمايند.

حميدالله فاروقى استاد پوهنځى اقتصاد درمصاحبه اى با آژانس خبرى پژواک ، استخراج معادن توسط سکتور خصوصى را يک اقدام موثر خوانده گفت : (( دولت افغانستان در گذشته هم توان اقتصادى براى استخراج معادن را نداشت و اکنون هم اين توانايى را ندارد. ))

وى گفت که استخراج معادن ، نياز به پول زياد دارد و معمولا در کشورهاى پيشرفته جهان چون امريکا نيز استخراج معادن توسط سکتور خصوصى انجام مى پذيرد.

به نظر وى ، ازطريق سيستم دولتى، استخراج معادن به نفع کشور نمى باشد و مشکلات موجود امنيتى در کشور مانع فعاليت هاى سکتور خصوصى در جهت سرمايه گذارى در بخش معادن شده نمى تواند.


Legitimacy of International Forces under question in Afghanistan

October 20, 2006


Neither NATO nor coalition forces are UN peace keeping force in Afghanistan but they are deployed under a mandate of the UNSC (four UNSCRs – 1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510 – relate to ISAF). the Bonn agreement called on the presence of international force in Kabul to provide security for the establishment of Afghan Interim Administration and to keep the city clear of Afghan armed groups. Unfortunately, the provisions of the agreement were disregarded in the first few days, eighteen thousand Northern alliance troops, those who burned Kabul to Ashes before being kicked out by Taliban, entered the town. The provision of Bonn agreement even at the time of convention was not taking ground realities into account, “the Bonn agreement was a cover up for US and UK invasion. The US and its allies start attacking the Taliban before Bonn convention and without Security Council endorsement.” said Akbar Aria, international relation analyst. the Bonn agreement didn’t consider who would provide security in the provinces and five thousand troops deployed under UN mandate was in no way enough to provide security in the most dangerous and destabilized part of the world, the force since then has been increased by 700% plus more than 75000 Afghan security forces but according to Chris Alexander the former Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan it will take three more generations to overcome the insurgency.
The Bonn agreement was a provisional arrangement for Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, the Bonn agreement was the initial series of agreements intended to re-create the State of Afghanistan. Now that the core objective of Bonn is achieved and elected government is established the government need to endorse NATO and foreign troops presence. ISAF under NATO command is claiming that they are on a “humanitarian mission,” and operates under UN command while they are not; it’s a counter insurgency operation, the toughest in the alliance history. Furthermore, previous UN “peace-keeping missions” were sanctioned by Chapter 6 of the UN Charter which calls for “peaceful settlement in a conflict” without the use of force; American-led Coalition Force and NATO-led international force deployed in Afghanistan is sanctioned under Chapter 7 which specifically lets UN-authorized troops use force to carry out their mission. In a proposal to Afghan Parliament, Afghan National United Front, an alliance of fifty political parties calls on the parliament to define the extent of use of force.
“There is no operational coordination procedure between international forces and Afghan security forces” said General Zahir Azimi spokesperson for ministry of defense. Five Afghan police were shot dead when their position was mistaken for Taliban hideout by Americans in Garishk district of Helmand province on Friday. A mechanism needs to be established to coordinate counter-terrorism operations with counter-insurgency operations and carry out all such operations in consultation with Afghan authorities. “We have several times intercepted foreigners in Kabul armed with heavy weapon in civilian cloths and cars” a Kabul police source which wanted to stay anonymous. Afghan security forces can’t question the identity and action of foreign troops in the absence of a national stand. NATO press office declined to make any comment on this specific issue.
ISAF’s mission was initially limited to Kabul. Resolution 1510 passed by Security Council on 13 October 2003 opened the way for a wider ISAF role. This is after ISAF came under NATO command in August 2003 and financed by common funding and the troop-contributing nations. The Alliance is responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force. This includes providing the force commander and headquarters. but resolution 1510 nor any of it’s predecessor authorizes NATO force in Afghanistan.
Coalition and ISAF had a Military Technical Agreement with the Afghan Transitional Government which still provides additional guidance for ISAF operations. the technical agreement is made under the auspices of security council and Afghan government is not the counterpart but a partner. The details of the plan are outdated and no more applicable. “I can’t prevent Taliban from killing Afghan civilians, but I also don’t have the mandate to prevent foreign assistance force” said Karzai in the inauguration of transitional justice program. “Bonn accord and United Nation were compelled by the white house to find a solution to Afghan question which was one of the most complicated issues of the world, the UN is in need of reconstruction more than Afghanistan, it’s over due since the end of the cold war. We need to rethink our international dimension. We are too preoccupied with slapping each other, starting with Pakistan; it has a better international position if Afghanistan is not considered as a bargainer. for twenty five years men we have in power now were in the service of Pakistani policy” said Akbar Aria international relation analyst

Afghanistan would be in a better position to resolve a lot of its internal issues if solution for international alignments is found. Let’s look at the latest Afghan-international commitments, this series of agreements impose the defeated faction and ideas on Afghanistan. “We are a small nation we can’t go to the world powers and organizations and enquire how they legitimize their action. It’s a matter of their interest. We have no say in our interest let alone to influence theirs. We are a consumer country and we rely on donors, we are in no position to negotiate with them, we can try to continue to ask them to give us money, give us food and a government” added Akbar Aria.

“Afghanistan is a long way from making international agreements. We can’t agree with each other, if we are endorsing the emergency Loya Jirga and the constitution then Presidential is the power system. Even our president doesn’t understand how a presidential system works, he is spending most of his time wrestling with the parliament while presidential system works on parties, the president comes from a party and the parliament has party stand. We have marginalized political parties so we can keep things simpler. Agreeing with each other and international partners increases efficiency. the head of our parliament can’t interpret article 50 of the constitution. What has been imposed on Afghan society put head of parliament in his place as opposed to efficiency.
Efficiency is not going to be increase if we replace Karzai or Qanooni (head of parliament) this is where we are now, in a vicious circle of undermining one another in the hope of a better solution. Let’s rethink about the system which is imposed by foreigners, if we come to some terms with them we don’t have to disagree with each other. Imposed policies delibately or ignorantly make us bite each other.” said Akbar Aria. Afghanistan’s international and multi-lateral relation is highly complex and it’s needed to avoid international distrust again, our parents got trapped in international distrust and we suffered for it a lot we don’t want the same thing for our children. “we lived in a government of nine flags at the throat of each other, I still see them in power, the only thing which hold them back is international presence and they are buying time. Whatever we do we need to stay with the international community” said Saliullah Sali, chairman of senate defense committee.

The question still remains who is our international ally? The UN, which sends “peace-keeping troops” for us or we need to search for alternatives. Last few decades witnesses that Afghanistan had a poor choice of allies i.e. USSR and then UN. both let Afghanistan down. the UN has played an important role in destabilizing most of the conflicts and has failed to prevent potential ones. UN failed to help Rwanda, Srebrenica and didn’t do enough to stop south African apartheid.
Geneva accord mediated by UN which resulted in the withdrawal of soviet forces failed to install “national government of peace and reconstruction”, to organize the Loya Jirgah, and an effective resettlement and reconstruction program. UN also failed to prevent interference and intervention in Afghanistan although the agreement contained mechanisms to deal with them. The 1989 Loya Jirga was not convened and a new wave of violence started. UN set backed and watched the three year long battles and then tricked Dr. Najibullah into resignation resulting in collapse of Kabul government and the destruction of the last social fabrics. Then UN witnessed ferocious inter-Mujahdeen war and a revival of Middle Ages by Taliban “Afghanistan would be better off if we could come to some sort of terms with any international partner without UN involvement. I’ll give you a couple of examples; the UN convened Afghan presidential election where they persuade American political agenda and sabotaged the election. UN corruption, wrong doings and bad policies also affected parliamentary election” said Bashir Bizhan deputy president of Afghan national congress party. “Legitimate presence of international forces is to the interest of both sides, if we reevaluate the terms an American soldier will think twice before they open fire on civilians in Nangarhar. They might spend more carefully the money which is supposed to change the course of our destiny on bottled water and fancy meals”

“We met with Karzai and NATO on Nangarhar shooting spree. It’s not enough to consider it only an unfortunate accident” said senator Salih of Kunar province. “The only way to stop civilian casualty and public discontent is to enter into new terms with foreign troops. Foreign troops have put signs on their tanks ordering pedestrian and traffic to keep away from them. Ambulances and sick people in need of urgent hospital treatment can’t pass over them. They will shoot them” said Bashir Bizhan. The number of civilians shooting as a result of breaching military parameters or not paying heed to military signs has increased tremendously over the last few months. There were at least five of them last week resulting in several casualties, one involved shooting at Pazhwok reporter in Hirat. Military experts I talked to believe this is a by-product of bad security and there is little that could be done to reduce the number of such accidents. It’s partly hard to verify the inevitability of civilian causality because it’s hard to know what really happened. Foreign troops deny access to the scene, associated press reporter was expelled from the scene and his photographs were deleted. Access by independent monitoring groups to information on civilian casualties; incident scene, detainees and displaced persons need to be facilitated.

Afghan National United Front, an alliance of fifty political parties in a proposal to parliament identifies NATO as a national and regional security risk. The proposal calls on all countries with troops in Afghanistan to conclude appropriate status of force agreement and standardize bilateral agreements on the treatment of prisoners with the government, subject to the approval of the National Assembly. War criminals and offenders of military and civilian statue should be prosecuted in Afghanistan under Afghan laws, if any agreement or protocol is in contradiction that needs to be announced invalid.


کشف یک توطئه

October 13, 2006
اسما حبیب خبر نگار بی بی سی خبر داده که انوارالحق احدی در مجلس سنا از افزایش بی سابقه ی معاش کارمندان دولت سخن گفته است. این خبرنگار نوشته است :
” در حاليکه فساد اداری به عنوان چالش بزرگی در برابر دولت افغانستان قرار دارد، مسئولان اطاق تجارت بين المللی افغانستان بر اين باورهستند که افزايش حقوق کارمندان دولت می تواند در کاهش اين پديده به شکل چشمگيری موثر باشد.”
به نظر شما وقتی چیزی به شکل چشم گیری موثر باشد ، خوب است یا بد؟ به نظر من بد است. فکر کنید که کاهش فساد اداری چشم گیر باشد. دیگر آدم نمی تواند فساد اداری را ببیند. آیا دولت افغانستان می خواهد ما فساد اداری را دیگر نبینیم؟ عجیب است. ادامه این مقاله در اینجا بخوانید

October 11, 2006
دیده بان حقوق بشر می گوید جنوب افغانستان، بر اثر جنگ و خشونت از لحاظ انسانی رو به انحطاط است.
دیده بان حقوق بشر که یکی از اصلی ترین گروههای مدافع حقوق بشر جهان است و مقر آن در نیویورک قرار دارد در نامه ای صریح، خطاب به تیم حقیقت یاب شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد نوشته است: جنوب افغانستان بر اثر خشونت و جنگ به سوی انحطاط انسانی پیش می رود.
گزارش نهاد مذبور حاکیست خشونتها، تنها از ابتدای سال 2006 تاکنون مرگ بیش از یک هزار غیر نظامی را به دنبال داشته است.
دیده بان حقوق بشر در گزارش خود آورده است: علاوه برجنگ، خشکسالی نیز منجر به بی خانمانی هشتاد هزار نفر در جنوب افغانستان شده است.
در گزارش دیده بان حقوق بشر، نه تنها طالبان، عامل این خشونت ها دانسته شده اند، بلکه فرماندهان محلی که به گفته تهیه کنندگان گزارش، برخی از آنها با حمایت ضمنی دولت افغانستان فعالیت می کنند نیز عامل نا امنی خوانده شده اند.
این گزارش، در عین حال نیروهای بین المللی تحت فرمان ناتو را نیز در افزایش خشونتها مقصر می داند.
در بخش دیگری از این گزارش آمده است: بسیاری از دستاورهایی که زنان افغان بعد از سقوط طالبان به دست آورده بودند از بین رفته و معلمان، دانش آموزان و مدارس مورد حمله شورشیان قرار دارند.
گروه دیده بان حقوق بشر همچنین از وجود فساد اداری، غصب غیر قانونی زمین، خشونتهای قومی و تهدید خبرنگاران نیز شکایت کرده است.